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An Open Question in Utah’s Open Courts 
Jurisprudence: The Utah Wrongful Life Act and  
Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sensitive issues and deeply held beliefs involved in this 
country’s ongoing abortion debate have generated intense 
controversy. Although the U.S. Supreme Court1 or Congress2 have 
occasionally entered the fray, regulation of the specifics regarding 
abortion is often left to individual states. In particular, states have 
been able to determine whether parents can sue physicians for 
medical advice and procedures related to birth and abortion. In the 
wake of various state court decisions allowing such suits,3 and a 
decade after the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Roe 
v. Wade, the Utah legislature passed the Utah Wrongful Life Act4 
(the “Wrongful Life Act” or the “Act”), prohibiting suits against 
physicians for such advice or procedures.5 For twenty years, the Act 
garnered only passing mention in Utah Supreme Court cases.6 But in 
2002, the plaintiffs in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center.7 
challenged the Act as unconstitutional, thus ushering it into Utah’s 
jurisprudential limelight. 
This Note analyzes the Wood decision and the constitutionality 
of the Wrongful Life Act. In doing so, it is intended neither to add 
 1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Most recently, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 
U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). 
 3. See, e.g., Gildener v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 
1978); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 
1975); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); Dumer v. St. Michael’s 
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); see also Utah Legislative Survey—1983, 1984 UTAH L. 
REV. 115, 222–24 (1984) [hereinafter Utah Legislative Survey]. 
 4. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-11-23 to -25 (2002)). 
 5. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24. 
 6. See C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 507–08 (Utah 1988); Payne ex rel. Payne v. 
Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 n.4 (Utah 1987). 
 7. 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003). 
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to the extensive commentary on the constitutionality of abortion, 
nor to make normative arguments for or against the practice. Rather, 
it focuses both on the effect of the Wood decision and the 
constitutionality of the Act as challenged under the “open courts” 
clause of Utah’s constitution. This Note first argues that the 
alignment of the Justices in Wood left at least part of the 
constitutional question unanswered. Next, it suggests an alternative 
to the conflicting standards of review used both in Wood and in past 
Utah decisions. Finally, it argues that, regardless of the standard of 
review used, the Act should be upheld as constitutional. 
Part II of this Note gives background information on the 
Wrongful Life Act and the Utah Constitution’s “open courts” 
clause. Part III describes the facts, procedural history, and holding of 
Wood. Part IV analyzes the Wood opinions: Part IV.A recommends a 
standard of review in open courts cases, and Part IV.B asserts that 
the Wrongful Life Act was properly upheld as constitutional. Part V 
offers a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Utah Wrongful Life Act 
On February 28, 1983, the Utah Legislature passed the 
Wrongful Life Act.8 It came in response to court decisions in other 
states allowing recovery for wrongful life9 and wrongful birth10 and 
was intended to prevent such suits.11 Utah was one of the first states 
 8. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-11-23 to -25 (2002)). 
 9. “Wrongful life actions are those brought by or on behalf of an infant, usually 
physically or mentally impaired, and allege that the child was born into a disadvantaged form of 
life because of another’s negligence.” William Shane Topham, Note, Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Action and the Impact of Utah’s Statutory Breakwater, 
1984 UTAH L. REV. 833, 834; see also Payne, 743 P.2d at 187 n.2. 
 10. “[W]rongful birth actions are brought by the parents in their own right, demanding 
compensation for costs related to the birth and rearing of the child.” Topham, supra note 9, at 
834 (footnote omitted); see also Payne, 743 P.2d at 187 n.1; Jennifer R. Granchi, Comment, 
The Wrongful Birth Tort: A Policy Analysis and the Right to Sue for an Inconvenient Child, 43 
S. TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1265–66 (2002). 
 11. See supra note 3. Utah Legislative Survey, supra note 3, a law review article 
contemporary with the Act, indicated that at least one legislator thought the Act was intended 
to prevent abortions, id. at 224 & n.747, and that an author of the Act intended it to prevent 
routine genetic testing and thus abortions, id. at 224 & nn.749–52. The article determined, 
however, that the Act “fails to implement legislative intent.” Id. at 224. 
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to enact a law prohibiting actions for wrongful birth, though several 
other states have enacted similar laws.12
The first section of Utah’s statute declares that it is the public 
policy of Utah “to encourage all persons to respect the right to life 
of all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition or 
dependency, including all persons with a disability and all unborn 
persons.”13 Based on that policy, section 78-11-24 states that “[a] 
cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on 
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or 
omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to 
have been born alive but would have been aborted.”14
Although there was some speculation at the time of enactment 
that the Act may violate a woman’s right to an abortion,15 no such 
 12. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1) (Michie 1998) (“A cause of action shall not arise, and 
damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act 
or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but 
would have been aborted.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (West 1998) (“A person may not 
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the person’s behalf based on the 
claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, the person would have been aborted.”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2003) (“(1) A person shall not bring a civil 
action on a wrongful birth claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child or 
children would not or should not have been born. . . . (4) The prohibition . . . applies 
regardless of whether the child is born healthy or with a birth defect or other adverse medical 
condition.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(2) (West 1998) (“No person shall maintain a 
cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct 
of another, a child would have been aborted.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130(2) (West 1996) 
(“No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on the 
claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.”); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 1998) (“There shall be no cause of action or award of 
damages on behalf of any person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the 
defendant, a person once conceived would not or should not have been born.”); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (Michie 1987) (“There shall be no cause of action or award of 
damages on behalf of any person based on the claim of that person that, but for the conduct of 
another, he would not have been conceived or, once conceived, would not have been 
permitted to have been born alive.”). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) (“No cause 
of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have 
been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.”); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (West 2000) (“Damages for the birth of an unhealthy 
child born as the result of professional negligence shall be limited to damages associated with 
the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1996) 
(“No person may maintain a claim for relief or receive an award for damages on that person’s 
own behalf based on the claim that, but for the act or omission of another, that person would 
have been aborted.”). 
 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (2002). 
 14. Id. § 78-11-24. The final section of the Act disallows use of “failure or refusal of any 
person to prevent the live birth of a person” as a defense in any action. Id. § 78-11-25. 
 15. Utah Legislative Survey, supra note 3, at 225–26. 
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claim made it to the Utah Supreme Court for twenty years. In the 
two cases that mentioned the statute, it either was found to not 
apply to the plaintiff’s claim16 or was not considered because the 
plaintiffs’ claim was otherwise barred.17 In Wood v. University of Utah 
Medical Center,18 however, the court directly confronted a 
constitutional challenge to the Act. 
B. The Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution 
One ground for challenging the Act as unconstitutional was a 
provision of the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 11—the “open 
courts” clause19—provides the following: 
 All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.20
“Open courts” or “remedies” clauses such as Utah’s have a 
strong common law background, dating from Sir Edward Coke’s 
restatement of the Magna Carta.21 Delaware was the first state to 
adopt such a clause into its constitution,22 and at present forty states 
contain a similar guarantee.23 These clauses were intended to serve 
two principal purposes: first, to establish an independent foundation 
 16. C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 507–08 (Utah 1988). 
 17. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189–90 (Utah 1987). 
 18. 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002). 
 19. Id. at 439. 
 20. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 21. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts 
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (1995); see also Craftsman Builder’s 
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1204 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 22. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 1285. 
 23. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1309 (2003). But see David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 
n.25 (1992) (thirty-nine states). The discrepancy appears to arise from the latter author’s 
omission of Georgia, see GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 12 (1998), although Schuman (but not 
Phillips) concludes that New Mexico includes a common-law guarantee, see Richardson v. 
Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1988), and Phillips (but not 
Schuman) concludes that Washington’s constitution implicitly recognizes a remedy guarantee, 
see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. See also John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State 
Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 237 n.1 
(1991). Regardless, the right to a remedy is widely recognized in a majority of states. 
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for the judiciary, and second, “to grant individuals rights to a judicial 
remedy for the protection of their person, property, or reputation 
from abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests 
that could control state legislatures.”24
The open courts clause in the Utah Constitution, according to 
an early Utah Supreme Court case, was specifically intended to place 
“a limitation upon the Legislature to prevent that branch of the state 
government from closing the doors of the courts against any person 
who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some 
known remedy.”25 Later Utah Supreme Court cases have construed 
the clause to provide both procedural and substantive guarantees.26 
The procedural guarantees are somewhat akin to those of the due 
process clause: “access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is 
based on fairness and equality.”27 The substantive guarantee is that 
“an individual c[an]not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights.”28
There are, however, limitations on the reach of Utah’s open 
courts clause. Construed too broadly, this clause might permanently 
prevent the legislature from enacting tort reform or caps on 
damages, exercising governmental immunity, or even passing statutes 
of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court, therefore, has indicated 
that “[article I,] section 11 rights are not always paramount . . . . 
They do not sweep all other constitutional rights and prerogatives 
before them. They . . . must be weighed against and harmonized 
with other constitutional provisions.”29
In addition, the open courts clause is not intended to create new 
rights or give new remedies. “Where no right of action is given . . . 
or no remedy exists, under either the common law or some statute, 
[the open courts clause] create[s] none.”30 It is also not intended to 
“constitutionalize[] the common law or otherwise freeze[] the law 
governing private rights and remedies as of the time of statehood.”31 
Finally, it is not meant to inhibit the legislature’s “great latitude in 
 24. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, 974 P.2d at 1205 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 25. Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366–67 (Utah 1915). 
 26. There has been substantial controversy in Utah over whether the open courts clause 
includes substantive guarantees. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 27. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 677. 
 30. Brown, 151 P. at 367. 
 31. Berry, 717 P.2d at 676. 
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defining, changing, and modernizing the law,” or its ability to 
“create new rules of law and abrogate old ones.”32
C. The Berry Test 
The leading Utah case interpreting the open courts clause is 
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.33 In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court developed a two-prong test for evaluating whether 
legislation challenged under the open courts clause is constitutional. 
Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy or 
cause of action withstands an open courts challenge only if it meets 
one of two requirements: 
[(1)] the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy “by due course of law” for vindication of his 
constitutional interest[, or] . . .  
[(2)] there is [(i)] a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated 
and [(ii)] the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.34
The Berry test is straightforward: if the legislature takes away a 
remedy, it either must have done so to eliminate a clear evil in a 
reasonable way, or it must provide a reasonable alternative. This test 
is designed to guide the courts in cases where the legislature has 
acted to limit or eliminate a judicially enforceable remedy. For 
example, in Berry, the court applied this test to invalidate a statute of 
repose for products liability.35 As the lead opinion in Wood pointed 
out, “[i]nherent in [the Berry test] is whether the statute abrogated 
an existing remedy or cause of action.”36 If no remedy has been 
abrogated, the two prongs of the test are not even implicated. 
 32. Id. Because “legal causes of action which provide remedies that protect section 11 
interests may, in some cases, have to yield to the power of the Legislature to promote the 
public health, safety, morals, and welfare,” id. at 677, legislatures can properly create statutory 
remedies—for example, worker’s compensation acts—that replace the common law remedy. 
 33. 717 P.2d 670. 
 34. Id. at 680. 
 35. Id. at 681. 
 36. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 442 (Utah 2002). The Wood 
dissent agreed. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The first step in deciding whether the 
Act violates the constitutional guarantee of a remedy is to determine whether the Act 
abrogated an existing legal remedy.”); see also Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021 
(Utah 2002) (“[W]e must first determine whether a cause of action has been abrogated by the 
legislative enactment.”). 
ROP-FIN 7/3/2004 2:18 PM 
893] Utah’s Open Courts Jurisprudence 
 899 
                                                
Although there were no dissenters in Berry, the framework that it 
established has since been challenged. One Utah Supreme Court 
Justice said of the Berry test: “[i]t is subject to manipulation, . . . it 
leads to absurd results, and it distorts our relationship with the 
legislature.”37 Another added that “this test permits a majority of this 
court to substitute its judgment of what constitutes good public 
policy for the judgment of the legislature” and asserted that “the 
Berry test is a straw man analytical framework that permits one to 
justify a predetermined outcome.”38 One scholar described the Berry 
opinion as “typical of the activist use of the remedies provision,”39 
using “wishful thinking,”40 and “almost casual[ly] invalidating” the 
law at issue in that case.41 Finally, the historical analysis used in Berry 
has been criticized.42 Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, majorities 
in the Utah Supreme Court continue to use the Berry test, most 
recently in the 2002 case Laney v. Fairview City.43 Berry was 
therefore controlling precedent when the Wood case arose. 
III. WOOD V. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CENTER 
A. Factual Background 
Fifteen years after the legislature passed the Wrongful Life Act, 
Marie Wood discovered she was pregnant. She and her husband, 
Terry, sought treatment from the University of Utah Medical 
Center.44 Specifically, they sought to learn whether, because of 
Marie’s age,45 there was a higher risk that the child would be born 
 37. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah 
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
 38. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1029–30 (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 39. Bauman, supra note 23, at 270. 
 40. Id. at 271. 
 41. Id. at 271 n.205. 
 42. See Daniel W. Lewis, Note, Utah’s Emerging Constitutional Weapon—The Open 
Courts Provision: Condemarin v. University Hospital, 1990 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1109 n.20 
(“[T]he Berry court . . . ignore[d scholars who pointed out that] history suggests that open 
courts provisions were never intended to have any bearing on legislative power. Rather, these 
provisions represented a uniquely judicial guarantee aimed at remedying judicial favoritism, 
excessive filing fees, or other discriminatory procedural mechanisms . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 43. 57 P.3d at 1021–27. It was there used to invalidate a governmental immunity 
statute. Id. 
 44. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 439 (Utah 2002). 
 45. Marie was 43 years old. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Wood v. Univ. of Utah 
Med. Ctr., 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003) (No. 03-82). 
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with a genetic disorder. Doctors at the Medical Center performed 
tests in early 1998, the results of which indicated that there was an 
eighty-five percent probability that the child would be born with 
Down syndrome.46 The couple claimed they were not informed of 
the results of the tests until late March and that the doctors 
tempered the news by saying that, because the tests often resulted in 
false positives, the chances of Marie having a child with Down 
syndrome were actually quite small.47 In August 1998, Marie gave 
birth to a baby girl, Mary Lorraine.48 Although she was otherwise 
healthy, Mary Lorraine was diagnosed with Down syndrome.49
B. Procedural History 
The parents filed suit against the Medical Center in Utah state 
court.50 They alleged that employees of the Medical Center 
negligently performed and interpreted the prenatal tests, and failed 
to provide the couple sufficient information to make an informed 
decision about whether to abort their child.51 The couple also 
included claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
failure to obtain informed consent.52 Finally, recognizing that the 
Act would bar their claim, the couple included a fourth “cause of 
action”—a challenge to the constitutionality of section 78-11-24 of 
the Act.53
In response, the Medical Center filed a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, claiming that the Wrongful Life Act barred all of the 
couple’s claims.54 The district court granted the motion.55 Plaintiffs 
appealed, attacking the constitutionality of section 78-11-24 on 
several grounds.56 They claimed that it violated the open courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution, the due process clauses of both the 
 46. Wood, 67 P.3d at 439. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 439–40. 
 52. Id. at 440. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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federal and Utah constitutions, and equal protection guarantees in 
both the federal and Utah constitutions.57
On the last day of 2002, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s decision.58 The court was highly fractured, with only 
two of the five justices joining in a lead opinion.59 The Chief Justice 
wrote a vigorous dissent, joined in full by another justice.60 Finally, 
Justice Howe agreed with the first part of the Chief Justice’s dissent61 
but concurred in the result of several major parts of the lead 
opinion62—thus providing what seemed to be a majority in favor of 
upholding the constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act. 
C. The Open Courts Holding in Wood 
1. The lead and dissenting opinions 
Despite the limited reach of Utah’s open courts clause, the Wood 
plaintiffs claimed that because the Act eliminated their ability to 
recover for the Medical Center’s alleged negligence, it violated the 
open courts clause.63 In evaluating this claim, the lead opinion and 
the dissent disagreed on two “open courts questions.”64 They 
disagreed first as to the degree of deference afforded the legislature 
when any statute is challenged under the open courts clause (the 
standard of review) and second as to the constitutionality of the 
Wrongful Life Act. 
The lead opinion, authored by Justice Wilkins and joined by 
Justice Durrant, answered both open courts questions in Part I of 
 57. Id. Although each of these challenges to the Act presents important constitutional 
issues, this Note deals solely with the open courts question. A majority of the court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act on each of the other challenges. Id. at 447–49.  
 58. Id. at 436. 
 59. Id. at 450. Because of ambiguity and potential confusion in the Wood opinions, 
discussed below, this Note refrains from referring to any one opinion as the “majority” 
opinion. For purpose of this Note, Justice Wilkins’s opinion is termed the “lead opinion” and 
Chief Justice Durham’s opinion is termed the “dissent” or “dissenting opinion” (although it 
commanded a majority on one issue). 
 60. Id. at 461 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). This other justice also filed a separate dissent. 
Id. (Russon, J., concurring in Chief Justice Durham’s dissenting opinion). 
 61. Id. (Howe, J., concurring in Part I of Chief Justice Durham’s dissenting opinion). 
 62. Id. at 450 (Howe, J., concurring in part). As Part III.C of this Note indicates, 
however, the opinions failed to conclusively resolve the open courts challenge. 
 63. Id. at 441. 
 64. Throughout this Note, reference is made to the two issues relating to the open 
courts clause—(1) standard of review and (2) constitutionality—as “open courts questions.” 
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that opinion. In Part I.A, Justice Wilkins concluded that the proper 
standard of review for open courts cases is a presumption of 
constitutionality.65 In Part I.B, he evaluated the constitutionality of 
the Act, concluding that “[t]he Utah Wrongful Life Act does not 
violate the Open Courts Clause.”66 However, since the Utah 
Supreme Court is currently composed of five justices,67 and since 
only two of the justices joined in the lead opinion, that opinion did 
not command a majority on either of these conclusions.68
In contrast, Chief Justice Durham concluded in Part I of the 
dissenting opinion that open courts challenges should be analyzed 
using heightened scrutiny.69 In Part II, she concluded that “the 
Act . . . violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution,” and 
would therefore have struck it down as unconstitutional.70 Justices 
Russon and Howe joined in the dissenting opinion on the standard 
of review issue, but only Justice Russon joined the dissent in finding 
a violation of the open courts clause.71
2. The unusual result 
The Wood holding on the two open courts questions is not 
immediately obvious. Clearly, there was a majority on the standard 
of review issue—three of the five justices held that the proper 
standard is one of heightened scrutiny.72 However, on the second 
 65. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440–41. 
 66. Id. at 450. 
 67. UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 2; An Overview of the Utah Supreme Court, at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
 68. However, some phrases from the lead opinion indicate that its author assumed that 
it commanded a majority vote on both of the open courts questions. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441 n.1 
(“[W]e apply the Berry test to the instant case to reach the decision of this court, that the 
challenged legislation is constitutional.”); id. at 443 (“We therefore hold that the legislation in 
question was a constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the Open 
Courts Clause.”); id. at 450 (“The Utah Wrongful Life Act does not violate the Open Courts 
Clause . . . and we therefore uphold the Act as constitutional.”); id. (“[T]he decision of the 
district court is affirmed.”). 
 69. Id. at 450–52 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).  
 70. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 461 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 72. Although Chief Justice Durham notes in dissent that “the majority of this court 
upholds a heightened standard of review” for open courts cases and asserts that this fact 
“undermines the legal analysis in this decision and the lead opinion’s conclusion that the Act is 
constitutional,” id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting), she later seems to treat the lead opinion 
as being supported by a majority, id. at 451–52 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the 
lead opinion’s standard “opens questions about the standards this court has applied to review 
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issue (the constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act), two justices 
voted to uphold the statute as constitutional,73 and two justices 
voted to find it unconstitutional.74 Because Justice Howe expressed 
no opinion on the constitutionality of the Act,75 neither position 
commanded a majority of the court. 
Given this alignment, the statute was upheld as constitutional for 
two reasons. First, it was upheld because the Utah Constitution 
requires that for a statute to be found unconstitutional, a majority of 
the court must so vote.76 The second, and more procedurally 
interesting, reason is that when an appellate court is equally divided 
on an issue, the ruling of the lower court is affirmed.77 Because the 
lower court found the Wrongful Life Act to be constitutional,78 the 
Act’s constitutionality, as challenged under the open courts clause, 
was affirmed by an equally divided court. Though affirmance by an 
equally divided court is not without precedent in Utah79 or other 
jurisdictions,80 it is nonetheless the exceptional case where an equal 
 
challenges to all article 1 rights. I believe this approach is incorrect and unwise.”). See also 
Marie Wood and Terry Borman v. University of Utah Medical Center, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 
275 (2003) (omitting the dissenting opinion, apparently concluding that the lead opinion 
commanded a majority on all issues). 
 73. Wood, 67 P.3d at 443 (“We therefore hold that the legislation in question was a 
constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the Open Courts Clause.”). 
 74. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The Act therefore violates article I, section 
11 of the Utah Constitution.”). 
 75. See id. at 450 (“Justice Howe concurs in the result in parts II and III of Justice 
Wilkins’ opinion.”); id. at 461 (“Justice Howe concurs in Part I of Chief Justice Durham’s 
dissenting opinion.”). 
 76. UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 2 (“The [Utah Supreme C]ourt shall not declare any law 
unconstitutional . . . except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 77. See Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1337 (Utah 1987) (“We are evenly divided 
[on one of the plaintiff’s claims] . . . and we must affirm the summary judgment on that 
issue.”); Stimpson v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 31 P. 449, 450 (Utah Terr. 1892) (“The court 
being equally divided in opinion, this judgment is affirmed.”); see also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate 
Review § 832 (2003) (“Where an appellate court is equally divided on an appeal before it, the 
decision below is generally considered to be affirmed.”). See generally William L. Reynolds & 
Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 
N.C. L. REV. 29 (1983) (describing the history of this rule and criticizing automatic affirmance 
by an equally divided court); Daniel Egger, Note, Court of Appeals Review of Agency Action: 
The Problem of En Banc Ties, 100 YALE L.J. 471 (1990). 
 78. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440. 
 79. See supra note 77. 
 80. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003); Massachusetts v. 
White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978); Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); Jean v. Collins, 221 
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000); Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc); Anderson v. State ex rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 
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division is due to one justice’s failure to express an opinion on an 
issue, rather than to, because of recusal or other reasons, there being 
an even number of justices participating in the decision. In Wood, the 
affirmance is somewhat ironic, given that the only two justices who 
voted to affirm used a deferential standard of review in their analysis, 
whereas a majority held that heightened scrutiny is the proper 
standard. 
Nor was the equal divide the end of the complex Wood 
proceedings. Justice Howe, who had expressed no opinion on the 
constitutionality of the Act vis-à-vis the open courts clause,81 retired 
on December 31, 2002.82 Wood was one of the last two cases he 
participated in as a Utah Supreme Court Justice; the opinions were 
filed on the day he retired.83 Two months later, on February 26, 
2003, Justice Jill Parrish was confirmed by the Utah Senate as Justice 
Howe’s replacement on the Utah Supreme Court.84 Because 
“rehearings have been granted in situations where [a c]ourt had 
affirmed judgments by [an] equally divided court[], but soon 
thereafter a new justice was appointed, who could break the tie on 
rehearing,”85 her appointment opened the possibility of a rehearing 
 
2003); DeStefano v. Nichols ex rel. Nichols, 84 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2004); Benson v. First Trust 
& Sav. Bank, 145 So. 182 (Fla. 1932); Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 
1332 (Ill. 1984); State v. Henriksen, No. 02-1329, 2004 WL 345514 (Iowa Feb. 25, 2004); 
State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2002); Pierce v. Pierce, 767 P.2d 292 
(Kan. 1989); Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp., 661 A.2d 796 (N.J. 1995); Tate v. Christy, 
454 S.E.2d 242 (N.C. 1995); Felton v. Hosp. Guild of Thomasville, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 297 
(N.C. 1982); State v. Cargill, 851 P.2d 1141 (Or. 1993); Christensen v. Epley, 601 P.2d 
1216, 1218 (Or. 1979); State v. Pine, 45 P.3d 151 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Commonwealth v. 
Stair, 699 A.2d 1250 (Pa. 1997); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 789 (Va. App. 2004). 
 81. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 450, 461. 
 82. Elizabeth Neff, Colleagues, Friends Honor Retired Justice Howe, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Jan. 16, 2003, http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Jan/01162003/Utah/20631.asp. 
 83. Supreme Court Opinions by Date—2002, at http://www.utcourts.gov/ 
opinions/supopin/scbydate02.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). 
 84. Elizabeth Neff, Senate OKs Two Supreme Court Justices, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 27, 
2003, http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Feb/02272003/utah/33295.asp. 
 85. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 892 (2003); see, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 902 (1955), reh’g granted, 349 U.S. 926 (1955), different result 
reached on reh’g, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Indian Towing 
Co. on October 14, 1954—five days after the death of Justice Robert Jackson. Indian Towing 
Co. v. United States, 348 U.S. 810 (1955). Although Justice Harlan replaced Justice Jackson 
on March 16, 1955, he did not participate in Indian Towing Co., which was decided on April 
11 of that year. Indian Towing Co., 349 U.S. at 902. After Justice Harlan’s appointment, on 
May 16, the Court subsequently granted a rehearing. Indian Towing Co., 349 U.S. at 926. On 
rehearing, the court reached a different result, entering a final judgment on November 21. 
Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 61. 
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of the Wood case. In fact, a petition for rehearing was made, but was 
denied on April 14, 2003.86 The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on October 14, 2003.87
3. Precedential value 
As a result of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision to not rehear 
the case and the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the 
constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act was conclusively affirmed 
on all counts. However, because the affirmance of constitutionality 
under the open courts clause was by an equally divided court, its 
value as precedent may be considerably diminished or possibly even 
nonexistent.88 At the very least, it is clear that the Utah Supreme 
Court has yet to conclusively decide the constitutionality of the Act 
 86. Wood, 67 P.3d at 436. The denial of the request for rehearing is not very surprising. 
Utah does not allow judges who join the Supreme Court after the court has rendered its 
decision in a case (in Wood, that date was December 31, 2002) to participate in the 
consideration of a petition for rehearing. Cordner v. Cordner, 64 P.2d 828, 828–29 (Utah 
1937). Therefore, Justice Parrish did not participate in the vote. Also, Justice Russon retired in 
early 2003—possibly before the vote on the petition for rehearing—and his replacement, 
Justice Nehring, would have been unable to vote on the petition due to the Cordner rule. 
Therefore, the only Justices who considered the petition for rehearing were Justices Wilkins 
and Durrant (who, respectively, wrote and concurred in the lead opinion), Chief Justice 
Durham (who authored the main dissent), and possibly Justice Russon (who joined in the 
dissent). It seems probable, then, that the vote for rehearing ended in either a 2–1 vote, 
against, or a 2–2 deadlock. 
 87. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003) (No. 03-82). The denial 
of certiorari was of minor importance on the open courts questions because the U.S. Supreme 
Court almost certainly would not have interfered with the Utah Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of a state constitutional provision, since the U.S. Supreme Court does not have 
jurisdiction over such interpretations. See 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1993) (defining the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts).  
 88. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 293 (1996) (“[T]he judgment is not 
entitled to precedential weight because it amounts at best to an unexplained affirmance by an 
equally divided court.” (emphasis added)); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (“Nor is 
an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight.”); Stupak-Thrall v. 
United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Moore, C.J., concurring) 
(stating that since the court was equally divided, “this case has resulted in no law of the 
circuit”); Hudgins Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v. Am. Exp. Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2003); Anderson v. State ex. rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710, 713 
(Alaska 2003) (“An affirmance by an evenly divided court is not binding precedent.”). But see 
Harper v. Harper, 491 So. 2d 189, 202 (Miss. 1986) (“Prior decisions of this Court have said 
that an affirmance by an equally divided court is binding precedent unless and until the same is 
overruled.”); Egger, supra note 77, at 473 n.7 (“Potential litigants will of course be able to 
predict how the same court will dispose of the same issue in the future, which means that 
affirmance by an equally divided court can in fact both change the law and influence future 
decision making.”). 
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under the open courts clause. The two current Utah Supreme Court 
justices who did not participate in the Wood decision have yet to rule 
on the issue, and in a subsequent challenge to the Act their votes 
could bridge the equal divide in Wood for one side or the other.89
In any event, there is room for a subsequent plaintiff to make the 
argument, at the very least without fear of sanctions,90 and with what 
would seem to be at least even odds of success,91 that the Act violates 
the open courts clause. In fact, such a plaintiff’s case would be 
strengthened by the holding of a majority of the justices in Wood 
that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review in 
open courts cases.92 Unless a majority of the current court is willing 
to overrule the Wood holding on the standard of review question, a 
subsequent open courts attack would require analyzing the Act using 
heightened scrutiny. Part IV.A of this Note discusses in more detail 
the conflict over the appropriate standard of review, and Part IV.B 
analyzes whether the court should overrule the Wood court’s standard 
of review holding. 
 89. As explained supra note 86, the court’s refusal to rehear the Wood case does not 
indicate acquiescence in the decision by the new justices, as they were not allowed to 
participate in the consideration of the petition for rehearing. See Cordner, 64 P.2d at 828; see 
also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 31 (2003) (“Although there is authority for the view that where 
an appellate court is reconstituted after the decision of the case but before the time for filing a 
petition for rehearing has run or before the decision on such a petition has been made, the new 
judges may participate in the decision on the petition for rehearing, there is also authority to 
the contrary.” (footnotes omitted)); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 677 (2003) (“Where there has 
been a change in the membership of the court since the original hearing, a petition for 
rehearing should be heard and acted on only by the members of the court participating in the 
original decision.”). 
 90. Challenging the essentially undecided question of the Wrongful Life Act’s 
constitutionality vis-à-vis the open courts clause would not trigger sanctions since it would not 
violate the Utah rule requiring that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [in a 
pleading] are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 
11(b)(2). 
 91. Of the four justices who have considered the question, two have come down on 
each side. Based solely on this statistic, a plaintiff would appear to have a 50/50 chance of 
success in a subsequent claim. 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Standard of Review in Open Courts Cases 
The standard of review conflict between the lead and dissenting 
Wood opinions is but one instance of an ongoing debate in the Utah 
Supreme Court regarding article I, section 11.93 Although a 
presumption of constitutionality is undeniably proper “where no 
significant constitutional right is claimed to have been abrogated”94 
and the presumption clearly must give way when certain 
constitutional rights are at issue, there is substantial disagreement as 
to whether the open courts clause guarantees significant rights that 
implicate heightened scrutiny. As indicated above in Part III.C, the 
dissent in Wood actually garnered a majority vote on this issue, which 
held that heightened scrutiny is required in open courts cases.95 This 
section analyzes the standard of review analysis in both the lead and 
dissenting opinions and ultimately recommends following a different 
approach, derived in part from the Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
Currier v. Holden.96
1. The dissent’s open courts standard of review 
Although a majority of the court agreed with the standard of 
review advocated in the dissenting opinion, the dissent’s argument 
was nonetheless written as a reaction to the lead opinion.97 The 
dissent asserted that the lead opinion’s “brief, two-paragraph 
[standard of review] analysis . . . abandoned [the] carefully crafted 
and long relied-on analytic model” in open courts cases, choosing 
instead to use a “blunt instrument”—presumption of 
constitutionality.98 Such a presumption, the dissent emphasized, 
should not apply when a significant constitutional right is claimed to 
 93. The debate is evident in the conflicts between the majority and dissenting opinions 
in various Utah cases. See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002); Craftsman 
Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999); Condemarin v. Univ. 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985). 
 94. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 450 (Utah 2002). 
 95. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 96. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
 97. This further compounded the confusion as to the Wood holding. See supra note 68. 
 98. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).  
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have been violated.99 The dissent focused on three reasons for using 
heightened scrutiny in analyzing open courts cases: the open courts 
clause’s location in article I next to other important rights, the 
importance of the rights protected by the open courts clause, and 
past Utah Supreme Court precedent using heightened scrutiny in 
open courts cases.100 For these reasons, according to the dissent, 
legislation challenged using that section must be analyzed using 
heightened scrutiny. 
The Chief Justice first relied on the open courts clause’s location 
in article I to support a heightened scrutiny standard. She disputed 
what she characterized as the lead opinion’s claim that “article I, 
section 11 rights are ‘no more important and [have] no greater 
weight as a constitutional provision than other constitutional 
provisions.’”101 She argued instead that a constitutional provision 
that protects significant individual rights is more important than 
provisions that do not protect such rights and should therefore 
trigger a heightened scrutiny standard.102 To support this claim, she 
stated that 
article I of the Utah Constitution, known as the “Declaration of 
Rights,” contains affirmative guarantees of specific individual rights 
that are indeed fundamental. Article I, section 11 rights are no 
more important than other article I rights, but . . . most, if not all, 
of these rights have generated some form of heightened judicial 
scrutiny.103
 99. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original). Confusingly, the text she 
included in quotation marks does not appear anywhere within the lead opinion. Perhaps it is a 
reference to an earlier draft of that opinion. 
 102. The dissent quoted from a 1941 concurring opinion to that effect: “[A] court will 
exercise stricter scrutiny in evaluating measures that encroach upon civil liberties than it will 
with respect to statutes that impact . . . only economic interests.” Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (Utah 1941) (Wolfe, J., 
concurring)). 
 103. Id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Although this language avoids explicitly 
calling article I, section 11 rights “fundamental,” it does (1) indicate that at least some (perhaps 
all) article I rights are fundamental, and (2) imply that section 11 rights are as important as 
other (perhaps all other) article I rights. At the very least, Chief Justice Durham is asserting 
that section 11 rights are closely related to fundamental rights, and she may be implicitly 
asserting that they are fundamental. But see id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“Although 
this court has not recognized the guarantee included in article I, section 11 as ‘fundamental,’ 
as Justice Zimmerman has noted, ‘I do not think we intended to denigrate the importance of 
the rights protected from legislative abridgement by article I, section 11. . . .’ This court has 
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She then listed eight article I rights104 and, for each,105 cited at 
least one Utah case where the court used heightened scrutiny in 
analyzing legislation that was challenged based on the article I 
right.106 The Chief Justice concluded that “this court has consistently 
applied various forms of heightened review when article I rights are 
at issue.”107
The dissent then asserted that rights guaranteed in the open 
courts clause are likewise important rights. She asserted that the 
open courts clause is meant to “protect injured persons who are 
isolated in society and lack political influence by guaranteeing them 
access to the courts.”108 That clause guarantees “‘the availability of 
legal remedies for vindicating the great interest that individuals . . . 
have in the integrity of their persons, property, and reputations.’”109 
The drafters of the Utah Constitution included the open courts 
clause, the Chief Justice asserted, because they “understood that the 
‘normal political processes would not always protect the common 
law rights of all citizens to obtain remedies for injuries.’”110 
Therefore, the rights protected by the open courts clause are 
important rights that must be analyzed using heightened scrutiny. 
The Chief Justice also relied on past Utah Supreme Court cases 
in which the court “consistently rejected the presumption of 
constitutionality of statutes challenged under the remedies clause of 
article I, section 11.”111 She cited only one such case, Condemarin v. 
 
wisely avoided the ‘analytical straitjacket’ of federal equal protection analysis by avoiding a rigid 
test that dictates that some rights are fundamental and others are not.” (quoting Condemarin 
v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 367 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring))). Ultimately, 
it is unclear whether the Chief Justice thinks that article I, section 11 rights are “fundamental,” 
or what that would even mean in the context of Utah’s standard of review analysis. 
 104. The eight rights (nine, if freedom of speech and the press are separated) are: 
“religious liberty, habeas corpus, the right to bear arms, due process of law, the rights of 
accused persons, [protection against] unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of speech 
and of the press, [and] the protection against taking private property for public use without 
compensation.” Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). 
 105. No case was cited for the right to bear arms. Id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985)). 
 109. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 677 n.4). 
 110. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Laney v. Fairvew City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1007 
(Utah 2002)). 
 111. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
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University Hospital,112 and included quotations from two of that 
case’s concurring opinions in support of heightened scrutiny.113 The 
first concurrence in Condemarin argued that to presume 
constitutionality in open courts cases “is to fail to give any greater 
weight to a constitutional right than to a nonconstitutional interest, 
such as a general social or economic interest.”114 The second 
concurrence stated that “the presumption of validity . . . must be 
reversed once it is shown that [a statute] . . . does, in fact, infringe 
upon the interests enumerated in article I, section 11.”115
Although the lead opinion had cited conflicting precedent—
three Utah Supreme Court cases in support of a presumption of 
constitutionality standard116—the Chief Justice found those cases to 
be irrelevant.117 First, she discounted presumption language in 
Zamora v. Draper,118 arguing that the court used article I, section 11 
“to interject a ‘higher principle[] of justice’ that provided the 
plaintiff a remedy that he would not have had under the statute 
alone. . . . In essence, the court found the statute unconstitutional as 
applied . . . .”119 She next dismissed the lead opinion’s second case, 
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,120 as a case that “did not 
deal with article I, section 11.”121 Finally, she noted that in Lindon 
City v. Engineers Construction Co.,122 the court did not rely on a 
 112. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). However, she presumably also referred to Berry, Allen, 
and Laney, all previously cited in her opinion. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450, 451 (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 113. Wood, 67 P.3d at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 114. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 370 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., separate 
opinion). 
 115. Id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). Justice Zimmerman later 
abandoned his support for this line of analysis. See Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler 
Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). In her own 
Condemarin opinion (not quoted in Wood), Chief Justice Durham stated that “we [have] 
committed ourselves to something more than a ‘rational basis’ deference [for open courts 
cases].” 775 P.2d at 360. 
 116. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440 (citing Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 
916, 920 (Utah 1993); Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 
1981); Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981)). 
 117. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 118. 635 P.2d 78. 
 119. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Zamora, 635 P.2d at 
81). 
 120. 870 P.2d 916. 
 121. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 122. 636 P.2d 1070. 
ROP-FIN 7/3/2004 2:18 PM 
893] Utah’s Open Courts Jurisprudence 
 911 
                                                
presumption of constitutionality, but “actually undertook a review of 
the constitutionality of the [challenged statute],” despite observing 
that the “plaintiff does not support the point [on constitutionality] 
by any substantial meritorious argument.”123 The presumption 
language in Lindon, she asserted, merely indicated “that the burden 
of convincing the court of unconstitutionality lies with the 
challenger;” it did not indicate “that the legislature needs no more 
than a minimal reason for overriding a constitutional guarantee.”124
2. Problems with the dissent’s analysis 
As indicated above, the dissent’s analysis in Wood commanded a 
majority of the participating justices, thus holding heightened 
scrutiny to be the appropriate standard of review in open courts 
cases.125 Nonetheless, there were three important problems with the 
dissent’s analysis: it overemphasized the significance of the location 
of the open courts clause in article I, too quickly disregarded the 
cases cited by the lead opinion, and misconstrued Utah precedent. 
 
a. Overemphasis on the open courts clause’s location. The dissent 
first argued that heightened scrutiny is required in open courts cases 
because of that clause’s location in article I.126 The Chief Justice 
stated that “most, if not all” article I rights have “generated some 
form of heightened scrutiny.”127 However, one of the cases, 
Whitehead, which she cited to show that challenges based on the 
religious freedom guarantee of article I have generated heightened 
scrutiny, does not support that proposition. In fact, the court in 
Whitehead unhesitatingly stated that when a legislative enactment is 
challenged as unconstitutional, “[t]he act is presumed valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”128 The 
Chief Justice recognized this but essentially argued in Wood that the 
presumption language, in which she joined,129 is a facade, since “the 
 123. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073). 
 124. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text. 
 127. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 128. Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). 
 129. Id. at 941. 
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actual analysis undertaken by the court in that case cannot be 
characterized as anything but heightened scrutiny.”130
While it is true that the Whitehead court engaged in extensive 
analysis to determine whether the enactment at issue “survives 
constitutional scrutiny,”131 it is far from clear that it applied 
heightened scrutiny. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the district court’s ruling that a city council’s practice of having 
prayer before meetings violated the religious freedom guarantee of 
the Utah Constitution.132 The city council had argued that the 
practice should be upheld unless it was found to be 
“unconstitutional ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”133 Although the 
Whitehead court rejected this extremely deferential standard, it also 
unequivocally stated that “the burden of showing the 
unconstitutionality of the practice is on the [party challenging it].”134 
In addition, the court upheld the constitutionality of the enactment 
because the party challenging it could not show either that “the City 
Council favored particular religions or religion in general in 
scheduling participants,” or that “the City Council’s policy denied 
any group or individual a realistically equal opportunity to participate 
in favor of . . . religious groups or speakers.”135 Requiring this kind 
of proof by the party challenging the enactment indicates deference 
to the enactment, not heightened scrutiny. 
There is a second weakness with the dissent’s defense of 
heightened scrutiny based on the open courts clause’s location in 
article I. Although the exact number may be debatable, there are 
dozens of enumerated rights within article I of the Utah 
Constitution—many more than the few listed in the dissent.136 It is 
 130. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 n.1 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 131. Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 938. 
 132. Id. at 917–18. 
 133. Id. at 920. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 939. 
 136. There are over fifty independent rights listed in article I: The right to (1–2) enjoy 
and defend one’s life and liberty; (3–5) acquire, possess, and protect property; (6) worship 
according to the dictates of one’s conscience; (7) assemble peaceably; (8) protest against 
wrongs; (9) petition for redress of grievances; (10) communicate freely one’s thoughts and 
opinions; (11) alter or reform the government as the public welfare may require; (12) freedom 
of conscience and religious liberty; (13) habeas corpus; (14) bear arms; (15) due process of 
law; (16) bail for qualifying offenses; (17) avoid excessive bail or fines; (18) not be subject to 
cruel and unusual punishments; (19) trial by jury; (20) open courts; (21) appear and defend in 
person and by counsel; (22) demand the nature and cause of the accusation against one; (23) 
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therefore certainly not true that “most, if not all” article I rights have 
generated heightened scrutiny—only a small minority have done so, 
and most article I rights have not even been used to challenge 
legislation in the Utah courts. Although it is possible that heightened 
scrutiny would be used for many of these rights, this “guilt by 
association” argument for heightened scrutiny in open courts cases 
cannot be definitive. This is particularly true since the court in 
Whitehead did not use heightened scrutiny in examining a challenge 
based on an article I right.137 Nonetheless, with the exception of 
Whitehead, Chief Justice Durham correctly points out that using 
heightened scrutiny in article I, section 11 cases is “entirely 
consistent” with that used in other article I cases.138 This does carry 
some weight, although less than the Chief Justice would attribute to 
it. 
 
b. Improper rejection of the lead opinion’s cited cases. The dissent 
also inappropriately rejected the lead opinion’s cited cases. It first 
argued that the Zamora court could not have used a deferential 
standard of review.139 In Zamora, a plaintiff challenged as 
unconstitutional a state statute requiring the posting of a bond in 
suits against police officers.140 The court in Zamora, professing 
 
have a copy of the accusation; (24) testify in one’s own behalf; (25) be confronted by the 
witnesses against one; (26) have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
one’s behalf; (27) have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed; (28) appeal in all cases; (29) not be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure other rights of the accused; (30–31) not be 
compelled to give evidence against oneself or one’s spouse; (32) not be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense; (33–35) be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; (36) warrants based on probable cause; (37) freedom of 
speech; (38) freedom of the press; (39) not be imprisoned for debt; (40) free elections; (41–
43) not be subject to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts; (44) not be not be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses; 
(45) no quartering of soldiers without consent; (46) no slavery or involuntary servitude; (47) 
no taking of private property for public use without compensation; (48) uniform operation of 
general laws; and if one is a crime victim, the right to (49) be treated with fairness, respect, and 
dignity; (50) be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process; (51–
53) be informed of, present at, and heard at important criminal justice hearings; and (54) have 
a sentencing judge receive and consider reliable information concerning the background, 
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense. UTAH CONST. art I, §§ 1–28. 
 137. See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text. 
 138. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 451 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 140. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah 1981). 
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deference to the legislature, upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute.141 It concluded, however, that a pure facial application of the 
statute could conflict both with other statutes142 and the open courts 
clause in that it could prevent the indigent from gaining access to the 
courts.143 Concluding that the statute requiring the bond “should be 
so interpreted and applied as to avoid conflict [with other statutes], 
and to harmonize with . . . the Constitution,” the court thus held 
that the statute contained an implicit exception in the case of 
impecuniosity.144 In Wood, the dissent dismissed the deferential 
language of Zamora, arguing that since the Zamora court “actually 
used article I, section 11 to avoid a statute,” it could not have used a 
deferential standard of review.145 However, a court’s recognition of a 
potential constitutional conflict and interpretation of a statute to 
avoid that conflict do not mean that the court used heightened 
scrutiny. Rather, it is a further indication that the court was willing 
to defer to the legislature: the court properly presumed that the 
legislature intended to enact a constitutional statute and properly 
interpreted it as such. The Wood dissent seems to argue that a court 
may only engage in such statutory interpretation when using 
heightened scrutiny. If that were true, then a court analyzing a 
statute using heightened scrutiny could uphold the statute as 
constitutional, whereas a court using a more deferential standard of 
review would find it unconstitutional. This topsy-turvy result would 
turn the normal understanding of standards of review on its head 
and is untenable. The dissent’s rejection of Zamora is therefore out 
of hand—there is no indication in Zamora of anything other than 
deference to the legislature. 
Second, the dissent improperly dismissed Whitehead as a case 
that “did not deal with article I, section 11,” assuming that it was 
therefore irrelevant.146 However, as shown above,147 the case is 
relevant first because it is an example of an article I right not 
generating heightened scrutiny. Second, Whitehead also supports the 
lead opinion’s assertion that deference is proper when analyzing 
 141. Id. at 80. 
 142. This factor was not present in Wood. 
 143. Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80. 
 144. Id. at 81. 
 145. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 452 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 146. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 147. See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text. 
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challenged legislation generally; the lead opinion simply refused to 
find an exception to this rule for section 11. Finally, that Whitehead 
did not deal specifically with section 11 does not make it irrelevant—
the dissent itself discussed multiple article I rights together, in 
showing that “[t]he standard of review we have developed in section 
11 cases is entirely consistent” with other article I standards.148 It is 
inconsistent for the dissent to later criticize and dismiss the lead 
opinion’s inclusion of a case involving another article I right in a 
discussion of section 11. 
 
c. Misinterpretation of Utah precedent. Finally, the dissent 
improperly found that since the court in Lindon “actually undertook 
a review of the constitutionality of the [challenged statute],” despite 
observing that the “plaintiff does not support the point [on 
constitutionality] by any substantial meritorious argument,” it must 
have been using heightened scrutiny.149 That a court does not find 
the plaintiff’s arguments “substantial” or persuasive does not prevent 
the court from reviewing the constitutionality of the statute while 
still using a deferential standard of review. Because the plaintiff in 
Lindon argued that the challenged statute violated the constitution150 
and because “[a]n appellate court may . . . properly review the 
constitutionality of a statute [even if] the constitutional issue was not 
suggested, briefed, or argued in the court below,”151 the Lindon 
court’s decision to undertake a constitutional analysis does not 
indicate that it used heightened scrutiny. In fact, the presumption 
language in Lindon indicates otherwise.152 The dissent dismissed this 
language as merely indicating that the challenger has the burden of 
proving the unconstitutionality of the statute, not that only a 
minimal reason is necessary for the legislature to override a 
constitutional guarantee.153 However, this is a straw man—the lead 
 148. Wood, 67 P.3d at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981)). 
 150. 636 P.2d at 1074. 
 151. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 703 (2003). 
 152. 636 P.2d at 1073 (“Without satisfactory proof otherwise, constitutionality is 
generally presumed. . . . ‘The first legal principle to be observed is that there is a presumption 
that a statute is valid and constitutional; and one who questions it has the burden of 
convincing [the] court of its unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Branch v. Salt Lake County Serv. 
Area No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 460 P.2d 814, 815 (Utah 1969)). 
 153. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
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opinion makes no claim that the legislature needed only a “minimal 
reason” to override a constitutional guarantee; nor does that follow 
from use of a deferential standard. Ultimately, Whitehead is a 
relevant case, and Lindon and Zamora are valid cases that conflict 
with those cited by the Wood dissent. 
Despite the dissent’s analytical problems, the standard it 
advocates does have some merit. Applying heightened scrutiny in 
open courts cases would help protect the rights of citizens to appeal 
to the courts and help prevent overreaching by the legislature. 
However, heightened scrutiny is an “extremely strict” standard that 
“look[s] no further than . . . stated legislative objectives” and 
“[does] not consider additional plausible or even possible 
justifications.”154 It also “puts the burden on the statute to be a 
rational means of correcting clear social or economic evil.”155 Under 
this standard, “the plaintiff needs only to discredit the defendant’s 
argument in favor of constitutionality” to prevail.156 This has the 
potential of unduly hampering the legislature while expanding the 
court’s role in defining policy.157 Nonetheless, since a majority in 
Wood upheld this standard, it is still the law in Utah. 
3. The lead opinion’s open courts standard of review 
In evaluating the open courts challenge, Justice Wilkins’ lead 
opinion took the approach that legislation is presumed 
constitutional, even when challenged based on the open courts 
clause.158 In support of this claim, the opinion cited Zamora, 
Whitehead, and Lindon. From Zamora, the lead opinion quoted: 
[T]he prerogative of the legislature as the creators of the law is to 
be respected. Consequently, its enactments are accorded a 
presumption of validity; and the courts do not strike down a 
legislative act unless the interests of justice in the particular case 
 154. Bauman, supra note 23, at 270. 
 155. Id; see also Lewis, supra note 42, at 1116 (“The practical significance of the court’s 
application of the open courts provision . . . is that the burden of demonstrating the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute rests upon the party seeking to uphold the statute.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 156. Lewis, supra note 42, at 1117. 
 157. See Bauman, supra note 23, at 271 (“It is not clear why the court’s powers and 
abilities [would be] superior to the legislature’s.”). 
 158. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440 (stating that this deference requires “resolv[ing] any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality”) 
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before it require doing so because the act is clearly in conflict with 
the higher law as set forth in the Constitution.159
Based on that yardstick, the lead opinion asserted that the proper 
standard of review in Wood should be a presumption of 
constitutionality.160 As explained above,161 only Justices Wilkins and 
Durrant urged the use of this analysis. 
The lead opinion recognized that past decisions used a less 
deferential standard in analyzing open courts cases but concluded 
that those cases were in error.162 Because the court “has ‘not 
hesitated . . . to reverse case law when [it is] firmly convinced that [it 
has] erred,’” Justice Wilkins was willing to overrule those cases as far 
as standard of review was concerned.163 He concluded that “[a]ny 
heightened level of scrutiny simply because the constitutional 
challenge is based on the Open Courts Clause is improper” and that 
challenged legislation should be reviewed for correctness, “resolving 
any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”164
In her dissent, Chief Justice Durham claimed that Justice 
Wilkins’ standard of review stance stemmed from the fact, apparent 
in his Laney dissent, that “he does not regard article I, section 11 as 
having any substantive content.”165 If that is a true characterization 
of the lead author’s view,166 it follows that he would see no 
substantive rights in article I, section 11 requiring the protection of 
heightened scrutiny.167  Even if Justice Wilkins had no such 
underlying reason, he at least felt that in open courts cases there is 
 159. Id. (quoting Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981)). 
 160. Id. at 441. 
 161. See supra Part III.C. 
 162. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440. 
 163. Id. at 441 (quoting Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538, 544 n.3 (Utah 2001) (quoting 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 n.5 (Utah 1990))). 
 164. Id. at 440–41. 
 165. Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 166. Although this characterization is undercut by the lead opinion’s decision to adhere 
to Laney, see id. at 441 n.1 (“Laney is controlling precedent from this court, and we are 
cognizant of and respect the principle of stare decisis . . . .”), the lead opinion does state that 
Justices Wilkins and Durrant “are still firmly convinced that the decision in Laney to adhere to 
the Berry interpretation and test was erroneous.” Id. 
 167. Whether Justice Wilkins really believed that article I, section 11 has no substantive 
content is unclear, since he does not address the issue in his opinion. It should be noted, 
however, that there is considerable debate as to the substantive content of such clauses in Utah 
and in other states. See Patrick E. Sullivan, Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An 
Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150, 170–78 (1983) 
(describing different states’ characterizations of open courts clauses). 
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no reason to look beyond the standard presumption of 
constitutionality that is used in, as he said, “all other such cases.”168
Unfortunately, it is not clear what “such cases” includes, and 
there is little in the opinion to indicate what it encompasses. It is 
possible that the lead opinion was intimating that every case where 
legislation is challenged as unconstitutional requires “resolving any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”169 This seems 
unlikely, given the large body of state and federal law upholding 
heightened scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review with 
various constitutional challenges.170 “Such cases,” then, must have a 
limited meaning. One possibility is that it means “all cases that do 
not implicate[] a ‘fundamental or critical right’ or [the] creat[ion of 
impermissible classifications].”171 If this is the correct interpretation, 
the justices concurring in the lead opinion must not consider article 
I, section 11 rights to be “fundamental,” “critical,” or “important” 
enough to trigger additional scrutiny. While it is true that the Utah 
Supreme Court “has not recognized the guarantee included in article 
I, section 11 as ‘fundamental,’”172 this is in part because Utah does 
not use a framework, analogous to that of federal equal protection, 
of classifying different rights as “fundamental.”173 However, that 
does not indicate that article I, section 11 rights are unimportant.174 
In fact, the history of Utah’s open courts clause indicates that the 
rights are important.175 The problem with the lead opinion’s 
 168. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) (discussing equal protection and 
uniform operation of laws provisions); West Jordan v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 537 
(Utah 1988) (analyzing uniform operation of the laws); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988) (same); see also Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 
1069, 1085 (Utah 2002) (“Where a legislative enactment implicates a ‘fundamental or critical 
right’ or creates classifications which are ‘considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract,’ 
we apply a heightened degree of scrutiny.” (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., 903 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1995))). 
 171. See Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1085. 
 172. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 173. See Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366–67 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring in part). 
 174. See id. at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part) (“[I]n declining to . . . 
characterize the guarantee of a remedy of injuries [as fundamental], I do not think we intended 
to denigrate the importance of th[os]e rights . . . . Instead, we simply avoided being bound 
into the analytical straitjacket that has been fashioned out of the federal equal protection clause 
. . . .”). 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 21–28. 
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standard is that it does not give much weight to the protections of 
article I, section 11. There seem to be some situations where 
presuming constitutionality in the face of an open courts challenge 
does not appropriately protect the rights of individuals. 
4. An alternative standard of review 
Both the lead opinion and the dissent supported their positions 
with Utah precedent. In the end, it must be admitted that there are 
Utah cases supporting each side of the debate as to the appropriate 
standard of review. This debate ultimately seems to hinge on conflict 
over whether the rights guaranteed in the open courts clause are 
important, substantial, or fundamental rights that must be protected 
by heightened constitutional scrutiny. There is no clear answer to 
this question, and Utah case law is hopelessly confused. 
There is, however, an alternative to both of these standards—one 
which could potentially resolve the conflict and properly balance the 
competing interests of individual rights and legislative prerogative. 
This third option is presented in part in the Utah Court of Appeals 
case Currier v. Holden,176 and is in part advocated by other states.177 
This approach involves analyzing the two types of Utah open courts 
protections, procedural and substantive,178 differently. First, when 
acts—legislative or judicial—affect the procedures for gaining access 
to the courts, special protection is required. According to the 
alternative standard, heightened scrutiny is always proper in such 
cases. Thus, statutes that allow a party to create extensive delays in 
jury trials,179 limit or eliminate the jurisdiction of the courts, require 
payment of large fees to enter the courthouse, mandate arbitration 
or referral to a review board,180 or retroactively change the law181 
would be subject to heightened scrutiny. This would help prevent 
the legislature from improperly limiting the jurisdiction of the 
 176. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
 177. Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 215–16 (Ky. 1955); Murphy v. 
Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 113–14 (Md. 1992); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 599–601 
(Mass. 1971); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 
S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Mo. 1979). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. Although there is debate as to whether 
the open courts clause should provide substantive protections, Utah cases have consistently held 
that it does. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Werner, 280 S.W.2d at 214. 
 180. See Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d at 109. 
 181. See Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261 (Ala. 1939). 
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courts. Those joining Wood’s lead opinion would presumably 
disagree with this standard, but it properly advances one of the main 
purposes of Utah’s open courts clause—“prevent[ing the legislature] 
from closing the doors of the courts against any person who has a legal 
right which is enforceable in accordance with some known 
remedy.”182
According to this alternative standard, the substantive 
protections of the open courts clause are accorded a different 
treatment. In Currier, the court determined that the standard of 
review used in open courts cases may change depending on the right 
asserted.183 The court implicitly recognized that there are no 
fundamental rights necessarily found in the substantive protections 
of article I, section 11. Rather, the nature of the rights protected by 
the open courts clause depends on the remedy at issue. For a remedy 
to be needed, there must have been a violation of a person’s rights. 
It is the violated rights, not the right to a remedy, that this 
alternative view would evaluate in determining the appropriate 
standard of review. 
The Currier court indicated that “the nature of the individual 
right impacted by a statute influences the level of scrutiny which a 
court should employ in examining that legislation.”184 If a statute 
interferes with “civil liberties,”185 “individual liberties,”186 or 
“right[s] established by . . . the state constitution,”187 it would 
trigger heightened scrutiny. The alternative view would also hold 
that when the need for a remedy arises due to violation of a 
fundamental or important constitutional right,188 heightened scrutiny 
would be proper in evaluating legislative abrogation of that remedy. 
For example, legislation eliminating a cause of action for regulatory 
 182. Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366–67 (Utah 1915) (emphasis added). 
 183. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“Having 
determined that the statute at issue . . . creates a significant impairment of an important 
constitutionally based personal right, we conclude the challenge[] require[s] h[eightened] 
scrutiny.”). 
 184. Id. at 1364. 
 185. Id. (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing 
Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (Utah 1941))). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 
370 (Utah 1989)). 
 188. The article I rights that Chief Justice Durham lists are good examples of important 
rights that trigger heightened scrutiny. See Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 
450–51 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
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takings would be subject to heightened scrutiny since it involves a 
constitutional right,189 whereas a shortening of a particular statute of 
limitations, assuming it did not implicate any fundamental rights, 
would be analyzed under a deferential standard of review.190
This alternative view provides a way out of the dilemma of the 
lead opinion’s “always deferential” standard and the dissent’s “always 
heightened scrutiny” standard. The Court of Appeals of Maryland—
that state’s highest tribunal—has advocated a form of this 
approach.191 In Murphy v. Edmonds,192 the plaintiffs challenged a 
statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases 
under the Maryland open courts clause.193 In analyzing this claim, 
the court stated that a higher standard is implicated “with regard to 
causes of action to recover for violations of certain fundamental 
rights” where a statute would cause “an abrogation of access to the 
courts which would leave the plaintiff totally remediless.”194 
However, “the abolition of some common law causes of action, 
without providing an alternate remedy,” would not be held to the 
higher standard.195 Thus, where fundamental rights are abrogated by 
statute, the courts will examine the statute more strictly than where 
such rights are not at issue. 
This alternative approach would both permit the legislature to 
act and properly protect individual rights. Where a cause of action 
arises due to a violation of important individual rights, abrogation of 
that cause of action would be carefully scrutinized.196 Otherwise, the 
legislature would be afforded deference.197 This approach has the 
added benefit of eliminating the debate over whether the rights 
guaranteed by the open courts clause are “important” or 
 189. See UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation.”). 
 190. Such a statute could still be invalidated under a more deferential standard of review 
if it were shown to unreasonably limit access to the courts. It would, however, be presumed 
valid absent such a showing. 
 191. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); see also Phillips, supra note 23, 
at 1336 (“[S]ome opinions use different standards of scrutiny based on the nature of the right 
being infringed.” (citing Murphy, 601 A.2d at 113–14)). 
 192. 601 A.2d 102. 
 193. Id. at 104 n.1; see MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 19. 
 194. Murphy, 601 A.2d at 113. 
 195. Id. at 114. 
 196. This would avoid the weakness of the lead opinion’s standard of review—too little 
protection of individual rights against legislative abuse. 
 197. Thus, this approach avoids the dissent’s weakness—limitation of legislative prerogative. 
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“fundamental.”198 Rather, it allows the court to individually examine 
the rights asserted and determine their importance—a plaintiff could 
not bootstrap his claim into triggering heightened scrutiny merely by 
claiming a violation of the open courts clause. Although neither 
Wood opinion considers or adopts this approach, such an approach 
avoids the weaknesses of each opinion’s standard of review. 
B. Constitutionality Under the Open Courts Challenge 
Although there was a majority decision as to the proper standard 
of review in open courts cases, there was an even divide on the issue 
of constitutionality. Whether the Wrongful Life Act is constitutional 
under Utah’s open courts clause is thus still an open question. This 
section explores the lead and dissenting opinions, and suggests that, 
although the lead opinion did not use heightened scrutiny, which a 
majority of the court held was the proper standard, that failure did 
not affect the analysis; the lead opinion still came to the correct 
conclusion—that the Act is constitutional. 
1. The lead opinion’s application of the Berry test 
Justice Wilkins, the author of the lead opinion, dissented in 
Laney, where he called for the overruling of Berry.199 Although he 
stated in Wood that he was “still firmly convinced that the decision in 
Laney to adhere to the Berry interpretation and test was erroneous,” 
he applied the Berry test because “Laney is controlling precedent 
from this court, and we are cognizant of and respect the principle of 
stare decisis which gives stability and predictability to our legal 
system.”200
 198. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 199. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1028 (Utah 2002) (Wilkins, J., dissenting) 
(“In my view the current interpretation of the Open Courts Clause originating with Berry . . . , 
and the accompanying Berry test, places this court outside of its constitutional role and creates 
separation of powers problems. I would overturn Berry in favor of the more procedural 
interpretation of the Open Courts Clause advanced in our jurisprudence prior to, and since, 
Berry.”). 
 200. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 441 n.1 (Utah 2002). This respect 
for precedent may initially seem odd, given his decision in the immediately preceding 
paragraph of his opinion to disregard recent standard of review cases. However, although no 
post-Berry majority has ever rejected that case, Part IV.A of this Note shows the substantial 
disagreement as to appropriate open courts standard of review. In rejecting some standard of 
review conclusions, Justice Wilkins was simply selecting from two competing interpretations 
that had each garnered a majority. Notably, Justice Wilkins does not indicate that he would 
not overrule Berry, given the right case and the right composition of the court. He noted only 
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The lead opinion’s application of Berry is relatively 
straightforward and simple. The opinion observes that to answer the 
first prong of the test, whether an alternative remedy is provided,201 
the court must first answer the implicit question of “whether the 
statute abrogated an existing remedy or cause of action” at all.202 
According to Day v. State,203 this is a question of whether the 
remedy existed at the time of the enactment of the statute204—for 
the Wrongful Life Act, the year 1983205—and was abrogated by the 
statute.206 The Wood plaintiffs claimed that the Wrongful Life Act 
abrogated remedies for both “professional negligence” and “medical 
malpractice,” which they claimed existed in 1983 when the statute 
was enacted.207 “In other words, according to plaintiffs, their claim is 
simply a negligence claim, and because of the [Wrongful Life Act], 
their claim that would have been valid prior to the statute is now no 
longer available.”208 However, the lead opinion refused to evaluate 
the claim as a general professional malpractice claim.209 Instead, it 
asked whether wrongful birth was recognized as a cognizable claim 
in Utah when the statute was enacted. 
In answering this question, the lead opinion first noted that “[a]t 
common law, no cause of action existed for . . . wrongful birth.”210 
More importantly, it continued, “this court has never recognized the 
tort of wrongful birth in Utah.”211 To support this latter assertion, 
the opinion cited two prior Utah Supreme Court cases that dealt 
with the tort of wrongful birth. Although the decision in Payne ex 
rel. Payne v. Myers212 was issued after 1983, because the plaintiffs’ 
 
that “we apply the Berry test to the instant case to reach the decision of this court.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 201. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 202. Wood, 67 P.3d at 442. 
 203. 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999). 
 204. Id. at 1184. Day clearly rejects the alternative—asking whether the remedy existed at 
the time of statehood. Id. 
 205. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687. 
 206. Day, 980 P.2d at 1183–85. 
 207. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 442. 
 210. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 
1986) (citing Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 55, 125A (5th ed. 1984))). 
 211. Id. 
 212. 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). 
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claims arose before the Act was passed,213 recognition of the tort of 
wrongful birth would have established it as existing before the Act 
was passed. On this issue, the Payne court stated that “[a]ssuming, 
but not deciding, that Utah jurisprudence should recognize an 
action for wrongful birth, it is necessary to determine precisely when 
the parents’ cause of action accrued.”214 The court ultimately had no 
need to decide whether such a cause of action existed, because it 
would have been barred anyway by governmental immunity.215
The second case, C.S. v. Nielson216 also involved a claim for 
wrongful birth. However, in that case, the court distinguished claims 
for wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful birth.217 It 
defined wrongful birth as a “cause of action whereby parents claim 
they would have avoided conception or terminated an existing 
pregnancy by abortion but for the negligence of those charged 
with . . . prenatal testing or counseling.”218 Nevertheless, the Nielson 
court determined that the “instant case is correctly viewed as 
involving a wrongful pregnancy cause of action,” not a wrongful 
birth action.219
According to the lead opinion in Wood, although both Payne and 
Nielson “noted that other states were almost unanimous in their 
recognition of a [wrongful birth] cause of action,” neither case 
recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth in Utah.220 “At best, 
it was unclear whether such a cause of action might have been 
recognized by th[e] court prior to 1983, if it had decided the issue. 
The fact remains, though, that no such decision was made . . . .”221 
Because Payne and Nielson are the only Utah cases relevant to the 
issue, “the tort of wrongful birth did not exist in Utah in 1983.”222 
Therefore, because the Wrongful Life Act did not abrogate an 
 213. See id. at 188 n.4. 
 214. Id. at 188–89 (footnote omitted). 
 215. Id. at 188. 
 216. 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988). 
 217. Id. at 506. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 443 (Utah 2002). 
 221. Id. The opinion further stated that “[i]n the absence of a declaration by this court 
either recognizing, or refusing to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature 
set forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be recognized in Utah . . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 222. Id. 
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existing legal remedy when it was passed in 1983, the first prong of 
the Berry test was not even implicated. There was thus no need to 
analyze the second prong, which assumes abrogation of a remedy.223 
The lead opinion concluded that “the legislation in question was a 
constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the 
Open Courts Clause.”224
2. The dissent’s application of the Berry test 
The dissent, applying the Berry test, came to a different 
conclusion. The basis for the difference was that the dissent found 
the lead opinion’s evaluation of the claim too narrow. In essence, the 
dissent agreed with the plaintiffs that “wrongful birth” should not be 
viewed as a separate cause of action, but merely as a form of medical 
malpractice.225 It quoted from a Berry footnote stating that “[w]hat 
section 11 is primarily concerned with is not particular, identifiable 
causes of action as such, but with the availability of legal remedies for 
vindicating the great interest that individuals . . . have in the integrity 
of their persons, property, and reputations.”226 The dissent argued 
that the inquiry should not be just “whether or not, on the day the 
Act was passed, there was a specific cause of action entitled ‘wrongful 
birth.’ The inquiry must focus on the nature of the harm and the 
recognition that it . . . [is] cognizable at law.”227
The dissent then answered the implicit question of whether a 
remedy was actually abrogated in the affirmative. The Wood 
plaintiffs, the dissent asserted, were injured in person228 and in 
property229 by the alleged malpractice of the Medical Center. 
According to the dissent, they would have had a remedy available at 
the time the Wrongful Life Act was enacted—“[t]here is no question 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The ‘wrongful birth’ cause of action is 
nothing more than a legal remedy for medical malpractice based on negligence.”). 
 226.  Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 n.4 (Utah 1985) (quoting Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 
1360–61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993))). 
 227. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 228. “[T]heir personal right to make informed, lawful decisions regarding medical 
treatments and procedures [w]as subverted by the admitted negligence of the defendant.” Id. 
(Durham, C.J., dissenting). Apart from this assertion, the facts as given in the opinions do not 
otherwise indicate that the Medical Center admitted negligence. 
 229. “The right to be compensated for a personal injury is a property right . . . .” Id. 
(Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
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that a claim for medical malpractice [based on negligence] existed in 
1983.”230 Therefore, the dissent concluded, there was an available 
remedy for those in the plaintiffs’ position that was abrogated by the 
Wrongful Life Act.231
The dissent also relied on other court decisions to show that 
there was a recognition of wrongful birth claims in Utah. Of Payne 
and Nielson, the dissent said: “five years after the Act was passed in 
1983, this court assumed, albeit without specifically deciding, that a 
wrongful birth cause of action already existed in Utah.”232 The 
dissent also quoted the Payne court’s holding that the plaintiffs in 
that case were not denied their open courts rights “because [when 
their wrongful birth claim arose] they still had an opportunity to seek 
redress in the courts.”233 The Utah Court of Appeals,234 the Kansas 
Supreme Court,235 and even the Utah Supreme Court in Nielson,236 
according to the dissent, also concluded that Utah recognizes a 
wrongful birth cause of action.237 Finally, since Utah has joined a 
majority of states in recognizing a “wrongful pregnancy” cause of 
action “based upon a ‘negligently performed or counseled 
sterilization procedure or abortion,’” the dissent concluded that 
Utah must also recognize a similar negligence cause of action in 
wrongful birth situations.238
Having concluded that a remedy was abrogated, the dissent 
examined the first prong of the Berry test—whether the Act provided 
“an effective and reasonable alternative remedy”—and concluded 
 230. Id. at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Act has precluded them from 
pursuing any remedy . . . .”). 
 232. Id. at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citing Payne ex rel. Payne v. 
Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987)). 
 234. State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 235. Arche v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990). 
 236. The dissent observed that “the [Nielson] court . . . noted that courts ‘have been 
almost unanimous in their recognition of a [wrongful birth] cause of action . . . .’ Nielson did 
not except Utah from that list.” Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 506 n.4 (Utah 1988)). 
 237. Id. at 454–55 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 238. Id. at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing Nielson, 767 P.2d at 506). 
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that it did not.239 Since the Act does not even purport to provide an 
alternative, this was an easy analysis.240
The dissent then analyzed the second Berry prong—whether 
“there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.”241 The dissent 
argued that since the Act, on its face, “does not identify a social or 
economic evil to be eliminated,” deeper analysis is necessary.242 
Looking at “the language of the Act and . . . its history,” the dissent 
concluded that “it is clear that its purpose was to eliminate or reduce 
opportunities for the exercise of the lawful choice to abort a fetus 
with a prenatally diagnosed defect.”243 Because “the right to choose 
whether or not to abort is . . . protected in Utah, . . . as well as part 
of a fundamental right to privacy[,] . . . it cannot be considered a 
‘social evil’ for the purposes of article I, section 11.”244 The dissent 
concluded that since this was the only purpose identified in the 
history and language of the Act, there was no evil to be eliminated, 
and the Act also fails the second prong of the Berry analysis.245
3. The lead opinion came to the proper conclusion 
Neither opinion in Wood provided an analysis compelling to a 
majority of the court, leaving the question open. The lead opinion 
even purported to use a standard of review contrary to that upheld 
by the majority of the court.246 Nonetheless, this section argues that 
the lead opinion came to the correct determination—that the Act is 
constitutional under the Utah open courts clause. 
 239. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 240. The dissent indicated that the Act’s abrogation of a remedy without providing an 
alternative created an unfair distinction—plaintiffs are allowed or denied a remedy based solely 
on the kind of medical advice provided. The Nielson plaintiff was allowed to recover based on 
“negligen[t] . . . provision of information about sterilization.” Id. at 456 (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). However, due to the Act, plaintiffs are denied recovery for negligent “provision of 
genetic counseling.” Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). The Wood dissent argued that it would be 
“unfair [if] some victims of medical malpractice have remedies and others do not, even when 
the nature of the malpractice and of the injuries is identical.” Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 241. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
 242. Wood, 67 P.3d at 456 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 243. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 244. Id. at 456–57 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 245. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 65–71. 
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Ultimately, the heated debate about the appropriate standard of 
review was essentially irrelevant to the lead opinion’s analysis. The 
standard of review question would affect the degree of scrutiny 
applied to the Act and perhaps the burden of proof or degree of 
proof required.247 However, Justice Wilkins based his conclusion on 
the determination that the tort of wrongful birth never existed in 
Utah.248 This decision surely would have been the same regardless of 
the standard used—the existence or nonexistence of a cause of action 
does not depend on the standard of review used.249 It was therefore 
immaterial that the lead opinion used a standard other than that 
upheld by a majority for open courts cases. 
The dissent’s attempts to show that Utah did recognize wrongful 
birth prior to 1983 are unavailing. The dissent asserted that the 
Payne court “assumed, albeit without specifically deciding, that a 
wrongful birth cause of action already existed in Utah.”250 Despite 
the dissent’s attempt to downplay the significance of the 
“[a]ssuming, but not deciding”251 language, it is a foundational 
principle that “ordinarily, a decision is not a precedent on matters 
assumed therein, but not decided.”252 Even if that language is 
disregarded, the dissent is mistaken—the Payne court did not assume 
that a wrongful birth cause of action “already existed,” but rather 
that “Utah jurisprudence should recognize an action for wrongful 
birth.”253 The difference is significant because, at most, the Payne 
court was expressing an opinion, in dictum, that a wrongful birth 
cause of action should be recognized in Utah, not that such a cause of 
action was recognized. The dissent further asserts that the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court read Payne as 
recognizing a wrongful birth cause of action in Utah.254 However, 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57. 
 248. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 442. 
 249. Recognizing or prohibiting causes of action depending on the standard of review 
used would lend an air of uncertainty and unpredictability to the law, and would almost 
certainly prove unworkable. 
 250. Wood, 67 P.3d at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 251. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987). 
 252. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 162 (2003). Note also that “[b]ecause the question of whether a 
cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, it may be assumed without being 
decided.” 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 308 (2003). 
 253. Payne, 743 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added). 
 254. See Arche v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 479 (Kan. 1990); State v. Shipler, 
869 P.2d 968, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“[I]n an action for wrongful birth and wrongful 
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the Utah case was an action to reduce a conviction for felony theft to 
a misdemeanor and the court cited Payne merely for the proposition 
that “rights accrue only when the prerequisites for filing an action 
are fulfilled.”255 The Kansas court noted only that “Arizona, 
California, and Utah have sometimes been cited as states recognizing 
the action [of wrongful birth], but the issue has not been clearly 
presented and determined in those states”256—hardly a persuasive 
recognition. 
Although not offered by the dissent, it could be argued that 
wrongful birth should be recognized because if it had been 
considered prior to 1983, the courts would have recognized it. This 
claim is not only speculative but is also irrelevant. As the Wood 
dissent noted, “[t]he first step in [the Berry test] is to determine 
whether the Act abrogated an existing legal remedy.”257 That the 
justices on the Utah Supreme Court prior to 1983 would have been 
willing to create a cause of action for wrongful birth does not mean 
that such a remedy existed. As the lead opinion stated, “[i]n the 
absence of a declaration by this court either recognizing, or refusing 
to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature set 
forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be 
recognized in Utah.”258
The dissent’s strongest contention is that wrongful birth is 
merely a subcategory of medical malpractice. Indeed, several states 
have followed this line of reasoning in evaluating wrongful birth 
claims.259 Although those states may distinguish “wrongful birth” as 
a separate kind of malpractice claim, they use an analysis identical to 
 
life, the Utah Supreme Court held that the causes of action did not accrue until the birth of 
the gravely ill child.”). 
 255. Shipler, 869 P.2d at 970. 
 256. Arche, 798 P.2d at 479. 
 257. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 453 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. at 443. Note also that “the statute in question did not operate either to 
extinguish a cause of action after it had accrued or to limit the remedies available; it simply 
prevented one from ever arising.” Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988) (referring 
to the repudiation of loss-of-consortium actions by the Married Women’s Act of 1898). 
 259. See, e.g., Wood, 67 P.3d at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing supreme court 
decisions from Indiana, Delaware, Kansas, and Washington); see also Greco v. United States, 
893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995) (finding that there is “no reason for compounding or 
complicating our medical malpractice jurisprudence by according this particular form of 
professional negligence action some special status apart from presently recognized medical 
malpractice or by giving it the new name of ‘wrongful birth’”). 
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that used in “garden-variety medical malpractice claim[s].”260 
Nonetheless, this claim fails when applied to Utah. Wrongful birth 
has not been viewed as subsumed in medical malpractice in Utah, 
even if wrongful pregnancy has.261 The dissent does not challenge 
the assertion that wrongful birth did not exist at common law,262 and 
no statute or decision in Utah ever recognized it. For it to exist at 
the time of Wood, this cause of action would have had to spring into 
existence from a vacuum. In fact, the dissent’s statement that 
because Utah has chosen to recognize a “wrongful pregnancy” cause 
of action, it must therefore also recognize wrongful birth, proves too 
much. The court in Nielson took great pains to distinguish 
“wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth” actions,263 recognizing 
the former but not the latter. If, as the Wood dissent claimed, both of 
these are merely “garden-variety medical malpractice claim[s],”264 
then why go to the trouble of distinguishing them at all? The Nielson 
court obviously felt that there was an important difference. That 
these two claims are separated and analyzed distinctly in Utah 
indicates that recognition of one does not imply recognition of the 
other. 
In addition, many states do not accept wrongful birth causes of 
action or view them as subsumed in medical malpractice claims. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that “the establishment of 
wrongful birth . . . [is] best within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
legislature.”265 The Supreme Court of Georgia declared that “our 
current malpractice statute does not encompass a wrongful birth 
claim.”266 The Supreme Court of North Carolina indicated that 
“claims for relief for wrongful birth of defective children shall not be 
recognized in this jurisdiction absent a clear mandate by the 
legislature.”267 Although the majority of states have chosen to 
recognize such claims, Utah is certainly not alone in not having done 
so.268 Even some of the states that have recognized wrongful birth 
 260. Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 261. See C.S. v. Nielsen, 767 P.2d 504, 509 (Utah 1988). 
 262. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 452–57 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 263. 767 P.2d at 506. 
 264. Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 265. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986). 
 266. Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ga. 1999). 
 267. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. 1985). 
 268. It should be noted that the Act does not prohibit eventual recognition of any and all 
“wrongful birth” claims. Although it prohibits a cause of action for those who argue that they 
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claims have established it as a separate tort, not as part of medical 
malpractice. Ultimately, “[b]ecause no right existed at common law 
to recover . . . , the legislature is free to limit . . . liability in that area 
without implicating the open courts clause . . . .”269
Because the tort of wrongful birth was never recognized in Utah 
prior to its enactment, the Wrongful Life Act did not abrogate an 
existing cause of action and is therefore constitutional under Berry. 
But, even if the Act is deemed to have abrogated an existing cause of 
action, it should still be held constitutional. The second prong of 
Berry270 is whether “there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.”271 The 
dissent looked past the plain language of the Act to the history of its 
adoption, asserting that on its face, the Act “does not identify a 
social or economic evil to be eliminated.”272 The Utah standard, 
however, is that “[w]hen examining a statute, we look first to its 
plain language as the best indicator of the legislature’s intent and 
purpose in passing the statute.”273 The first section of the Act states 
that it is the public policy of Utah “to encourage all persons to 
respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age, 
development, condition or dependency, including all persons with a 
disability and all unborn persons.”274 This language indicates that the 
legislature was trying to eliminate two “clear social evils”—
discrimination against the developmentally disabled and emotional 
damage to children whose parents bring wrongful birth claims.275
First, the Utah legislature was trying to promote respect for the 
lives of all citizens—even the disabled. By allowing parents to recover 
for the unwanted birth of a disabled child, it sends a message to the 
 
would otherwise have chosen to abort, it does not provide a similar bar in the case where a 
parent would have avoided pregnancy altogether but for negligent advice from physicians. This 
latter type of wrongful birth claim, unavailable to the already-pregnant couple in Wood, could 
potentially yet be recognized in Utah. 
 269. See McCorvey v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993). 
 270. Because the Act did not provide an alternative remedy, the first Berry prong is 
inapplicable. 
 271. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
 272. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 456 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 273. Id. at 445 (quoting Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 
1998)). 
 274. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (2002). 
 275. Cf. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). 
ROP-FIN 7/3/2004 2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
932 
                                                
disabled that they are of less value.276 As an early wrongful birth case 
stated, “[o]ne of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that 
life—whether experienced with or without a major physical 
handicap—is more precious than non-life.”277 Respect for that life 
was one reason, obvious from the language of the Act, for 
prohibiting wrongful birth claims. As another court stated, 
proscribing wrongful birth claims “reflect[s] the state’s view that a 
handicapped child should not be deemed better off dead and of less 
value than a ‘normal’ child.”278 Second, prohibiting wrongful birth 
claims out of respect for life, even of the disabled, indicates that the 
Utah legislature was trying to prevent emotional harm to disabled 
children. As one court stated, if claims of this type are allowed, “[w]e 
are . . . convinced that the damage to the child will be significant; 
that being an unwanted [child] . . . who will someday learn that its 
parents did not want it and, in fact, went to court to force someone 
else to pay for its raising, will be harmful to that child.”279 One 
commentator persuasively noted that if wrongful birth actions are 
allowed, “even though a child will have independent evidence of his 
or her parent’s love, there will always be contradictory evidence (and 
a court transcript) to prove that the child’s parents convinced a jury 
that the child was unwanted and would have been aborted if the 
opportunity had presented itself.”280 These concerns vindicate the 
stated purpose of the legislature, and there is nothing arbitrary or 
unreasonable about the method selected—the legislature properly 
sought to eliminate a clear social evil.281
Ignoring section 78-11-23, however, the dissent concluded that 
“it is clear that [the Act’s] purpose was to eliminate or reduce 
 276. Paula Bernstein, Comment, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Why Traditional 
Tort Principles Do Not Apply to Wrongful Birth Actions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
297, 321 (2001) (“When a state allows wrongful birth actions, . . . it sends a pernicious 
message to its citizens with disabilities; that the state places a higher value on its ‘normal’ 
citizens.”). 
 277. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979). 
 278. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993). 
 279. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982). 
 280. Bernstein, supra note 276, at 320. 
 281. Allowing wrongful birth actions also implicates the problem of “eugenics as a birth 
policy whereby doctors are sued for not weeding out the unfit.” Monique Ann-Marie Croon, 
Note, Taylor v. Kurapati, the Court of Appeals of Michigan’s Decision of Refusing to Recognize 
the Tort of Wrongful Birth, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 317, 339 (2002) (quoting Matthew 
Rarely, Sliding into Eugenics?, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, at 31).
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opportunities for the exercise of the lawful choice to abort a fetus 
with a prenatally diagnosed defect.”282 This is a logical leap that finds 
no basis in the language of the Act.283 As stated in the lead opinion, 
“where the legislative purpose is expressly stated and agreed to as 
part of the legislation, we do not look to the [legislative history] in 
determining the intent of the statute.”284 The dissent improperly 
found that the sole purpose of the Act was to burden abortion and 
that “there is no . . . evil identified.”285 In looking past the language 
of the Act, and its implications, the dissent ignores the factors that 
would satisfy the second prong of the Berry test.286
V. CONCLUSION 
After the dust from Wood had settled, the Utah Wrongful Life 
Act was still standing, although barely. A unique combination of 
concurrences and dissents produced a confusing decision, particularly 
with relation to the open courts clause of the Utah constitution. This 
Note demonstrates that, although a majority in Wood upheld 
heightened scrutiny as the proper standard of review in open courts 
cases, there was no majority opinion as to the constitutionality of the 
Act under that analysis. Because the court was equally divided on this 
issue, the decision of the lower court that the Act is constitutional 
was affirmed. 
 282. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 456 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 283. Despite the evidence of individual legislator’s intent, see supra note 11, the Wood 
lead opinion properly noted that “[l]egislators may decide that a statute should be passed for 
myriad, often even different, reasons . . . .” Id. at 445. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
 286. Because it found no abrogation of an existing legal remedy, the lead opinion did not 
expressly evaluate the second Berry prong. However, in a footnote, Justice Wilkins indicated 
that “this case reveals an inherent problem with the Berry test, that it ‘simply sets forth a 
framework for justifying the policy position of a majority of the members of this court.’” Id. at 
443 n.3 (quoting Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1031 (Utah 2002)). His argument is 
that because both the plaintiffs and the defendants may have reasonable positions as to the 
existence of an evil, the court simply must choose which “evil” it prefers. However, this 
mischaracterizes the Berry test. The balancing of evils, even under Berry, is left to the 
legislature. As long as the statute remedies a “clear social or economic evil [and is] non-
arbitrary or reasonable,” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 
1985), it should be upheld—regardless of whether there are competing evils that are not 
eliminated. Because the legislature did identify and intend to remedy a clear social evil, the Act 
passes even this second part of the Berry test. 
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This Note illustrates that between the two extremes of the lead 
and dissenting opinions on the appropriate standard of review lies a 
middle ground, used in part by both the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Currier and the courts of other states. This Note also recommends 
that standard for future analyses because it appropriately balances the 
concerns of individual rights and legislative prerogative in open 
courts cases. Finally, this Note evinces that, regardless of the 
standard of review used, the Utah Wrongful Life Act should be 
upheld under the controlling Berry test. The Wrongful Life Act did 
not abrogate an existing legal remedy, and even if it had, the Act is 
supported by a strong public policy: eliminating the clear social evils 
of discrimination against and emotional harm to the disabled. 
Glenn E. Roper.∗
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